[Upbeat banjo music] NARRATOR: By the early 70s, Roy Lunn had noticed that most Jeep owners were not climbing mountains or fording rivers.

They were mainly driving on-road, and occasionally in bad weather.

As head of Jeep engineering for American Motors Corporation, Lunn wanted to bridge the gap between these extreme off-roaders and everyday cars.

[Explosion of snow] NARRATOR: But when his team cobbled together a four-wheel drive AMC Hornet, the noise and vibration were a problem.

PATRICK FOSTER: The early four-wheel drive systems, were still kind of crude.

You would feel a certain harshness, as you're steering, as you're driving along.

Now in a big pickup truck or even a big utility wagon, that wasn't a big issue, but you put it into a small uni-body car, and you can hear it.

And it just wasn't going to work out.

NARRATOR: The project was shelved until 1976, when Lunn quietly asked Vice President Gerald Meyers for the money to build another prototype.

JAMES CERANO: Roy Lunn was so secretive about it; you didn't know that it was being developed unless you saw it sitting in the garage and you asked yourself, "What is this?"

NARRATOR: Knowing the clandestine project could have gotten them both fired, Meyers approved it.

GERALD MEYERS: I thought it was a wild idea.

I didn't know if there was a market for a four wheel drive automobile, but I suspected that was worth a try.

NARRATOR: What Meyers really wanted to build was a new small car.

But doing that would be a lot more difficult.

[French music] ANNOUNCER: Funding for The Last Independent Automaker was provided in part by... [Driving rhythmic music] WOMAN: We are Detroit.

And when we move, you move.

ANNOUNCER: Funding was also provided by...

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation... MotorCities National Heritage Area... And also... For a complete list of funders, visit APTonline.org [1970s lounge music] PATRICK FOSTER: You'd look at a field of all the executives, and they'd all be wearing the corporate dark blue suit with either a blue or red tie, and Gerry Meyers would be there with an orange shirt and some really gaudy tie.

And he wore sideburns when everybody else kept their hair short.

That was just his persona.

He stood out from the crowd.

NARRATOR: By 1978, Gerry Meyers had risen to President and CEO of American Motors.

Tall and handsome, he was the youngest leader of any U.S. automaker, and the only one who was Jewish.

FOSTER: I don't know if Gerry Meyers ever personally faced anti-semitism at American Motors, but certainly there were people that didn't like the idea of a Jew running the company.

People would tell me various jokes that were passed around.

But, if he had heard them, he brushed them off and you know, continued doing his job.

[Audience applauds] NARRATOR: As with the rest of corporate America, AMC's WASP-y, male workforce was changing.

[Upbeat yacht rock music begins] MICHAEL PORTER: Racial diversity was becoming far more common by the seventies.

Opportunities were certainly opening up much more.

But there weren't a lot of minorities or women in the upper reaches of management.

It was pretty monochromatic.

SUSAN TASSI: You had to work with a good sense of humor.

At the time, that three of us working together, they called us "Charlie's Angels," and they called us "The Skirts."

And you could not act like it bothered you in any way, because then the tormenting would be worse.

NARRATOR: Despite this, American Motors provided ambitious employees with more freedom and community than other automakers.

FRANK PASCOE: Anybody who worked at American Motors will use that word, "family."

You could walk down the hallway and run into a vice president, "Hey, how you doing Frank?"

I mean, it was that close.

TASSI: It was sometimes a lot of pressure, since it was three women doing this, versus Ford or GM, or Chrysler, you may have whole departments.

But it was a fun place to work.

PORTER: Being one of the very few minorities at American Motors I don't think was a disadvantage in any respect.

If anything, frankly it may have helped me in the sense that people knew who I was, and if I was doing good work, people would remember me.

PORTER: But it was very definitely a different environment in the plants.

[Metal tinkering, machines running] NARRATOR: While legislation and union contracts had ended codified prejudice on the assembly line, personal bigotry remained, as minorities could face harassment and worse job assignments.

[Angsty rock music] ANTHONY DAVIS: Some guys would play pranks that I thought were inappropriate, and they thought it was funny.

Like anything, you had to pick your battles.

But if you saw something that was really egregious, then you know, you'd have to stand up.

NARRATOR: Frustrated, a group of young activists at AMC's Kenosha factories spoke out.

JOHN DREW: There were a lot of things that we wanted to see improved in the plant, and in the union, also.

So we started our own newsletter called The Fighting Times.

MALE VOICE: "The fact is, as we all work side by side busting our Black, White, and Brown asses.

We are all slaves to the white shirt.

Anything that divides us, weakens our unity in the union."

DREW: It was very popular.

People liked it, and management hated it.

NARRATOR: But with a stagnant economy and outdated products, an employee newsletter was the least of AMC's problems.

NARRATOR: Since 1974, car sales had been in freefall.

NARRATOR: The revolutionary AMC Pacer had gone from a best-seller to a costly flop, and would soon be canceled.

And while the '78 Concord and '79 Spirit were technically "new," buyers could tell they were heavily based on the old Hornet and Gremlin.

Thankfully, Roy Lunn's gamble paid off, when management approved his new four-wheel-drive car and its shoestring budget.

MEYERS: The investment that was necessary was minimal.

We had almost all the parts and pieces that we could put this together without a lot of effort, without a lot of cost.

NARRATOR: Essentially a lifted, four-wheel-drive version of the existing AMC Concord, it used plastic flares to hide its extra height, avoiding costly sheet metal changes.

And, by classifying it as a "Light-Duty Truck," instead of a "Passenger Car," it faced easier government regulations, saving AMC millions through what became known as "The SUV loophole."

FOSTER: The fuel economy tests and the emissions tests and even the safety, the bumper tests were all done on the basis of it being a truck, which they could do, as long as they didn't call it a car.

NARRATOR: But Lunn's true genius was the technology he'd found for the four-wheel-drive system.

Called a "viscous coupling," it used a series of plates, rotating in silicone fluid.

If a wheel lost traction and started to spin, the fluid would thicken, binding the plates, so the wheels all turned together.

Unlike a traditional geared system, it was smoother, quieter, and provided better traction.

Plus, it was automatic.

DAVID TRACY: People do not like, generally, they don't like levers.

They don't like buttons.

They just want to set it and forget it.

And when you're trying to build a mainstream vehicle, if you can give them something that has a passive four wheel drive system, people love that.

NARRATOR: Scheduled for 1980, management almost called it "Pathfinder," but chose the name "Eagle," instead.

NARRATOR: Meanwhile, Gerry Meyers had been searching for a partner to help AMC build a new high-tech car.

In the spring of 1978, he found one.

NEWSCASTER: American Motors president Gerald Meyers made an announcement that has been acclaimed by both the news media and economic specialists as one of the corporation's finest moves.

Mr. Meyers announced a tentative agreement between American Motors and Renault of France.

NARRATOR: The two companies would sell each other's vehicles in their home markets and build a new economy car together in America.

It seemed like the perfect deal.

GERALD MEYERS: We've looked long and hard for an automotive partner that could come close to being a perfect match.

We have found that partner in Renault.

We're going to step boldly together in new directions because we realize that we are making automotive history together.

NARRATOR: Both sides emphasized that it was a partnership, not a merger.

NARRATOR: That fall, Meyers became chairman, in addition to CEO, and former Ford Executive Paul Tippet, took his old spot as President.

By 1979, American Motors was on track to do the unthinkable, and sell more Jeeps than cars.

[Jeep drives past, people shouting] FOSTER: People were just lined up to buy Jeeps.

They just wanted them so bad.

When we would get one in, we would have a list of twenty customers who wanted the vehicle and it would be sold the same day it got in, if not pre-sold before it got there.

[Engine slowly rumbles] NARRATOR: The big Wagoneer, Cherokee, and trucks all got terrible gas mileage, and the smaller CJs weren't much better.

TRACY: There was not a lot of attention paid to weight, certainly none paid to aerodynamics.

I mean, these are heavy vehicles, and they were powered by enormous motors.

There's no way you're getting good fuel economy.

NARRATOR: But, Jeep buyers didn't seem to care.

Sales, and profits, kept growing, especially for the new Wagoneer Limited.

VINCE GERACI: Management says, "Give me a leather interior, high plush carpeting, really make it as upscale as you can."

'Cause the customer wanted it, and they were willing to pay.

FOSTER: The first one that came on our lot was $10,000.

And I said, "They've got to be crazy.

They are nuts.

Nobody is going to pay ten grand for a Jeep Wagoneer!"

Well, it sold the next day.

[Laughs] [Wheels rolling over gravel and leaves] NARRATOR: Then in February, a violent revolution in Iran disrupted oil production, triggering another fuel shortage, and rampant inflation.

NARRATOR: To combat rising prices, the U.S. Federal Reserve hiked interest rates, making loans more expensive.

PORTER: Interest rates probably more than doubled.

It was a really really a horrible shock to the economy.

NARRATOR: Almost overnight, Jeep sales crashed.

FOSTER: It was like a giant hand just turned off a faucet.

We went from having one or possibly two Cherokee Chiefs in stock to one morning we have thirty of them because people weren't buying them anymore.

PORTER: The company makes its money when the dealer buys a car.

So we try to keep the dealers as chock full as we possibly can.

But after a point, you have to stop making vehicles, then you are laying off workers.

But based on UAW contracts, you're still paying a big piece of that worker's salary anyway, so the companies begins to lose money in a big hurry.

NARRATOR: With losses mounting, the French stepped in.

NEWSCASTER: Renault has today purchased from American Motors, 1.5 million shares of American Motors common stock.

A senior Renault officer will be elected to the American Motors board of directors next week.

JOSH GREENPLATE: They were basically at the edge of insolvency.

They sent a letter to all shareholders requesting that they vote on the purchase by Renault, and it lays out how bleak things were.

There would have been no AMC after 1980 without Renault.

NARRATOR: Less than a year after claiming "no merger," Renault now owned 22.5 percent of AMC.

The desperately needed capital went toward the new economy car and a new, fuel-efficient Jeep.

But both were still years away.

NARRATOR: Fortunately, at least the new Eagle was well-received.

['80s techno music plays] MEYERS: We were surprised at how excited people were about four-wheel drive automobiles.

And the dealers got excited because it was something new that somebody else wasn't producing.

JEFF KENNEDY: The engineering and the components that went in the Eagle was far better than anything anyone else had at the time.

It felt like you're driving an everyday car, but when you needed the traction because of bad roads, especially snow and ice, the car just plowed right through it.

NARRATOR: The Eagle lineup soon expanded with more models, plus a fuel-saving on/off switch for the four-wheel-drive.

COMMERCIAL ANNOUNCER: The revolutionary 2 wheel 4 wheel drive Eagle SX/4.

The only sport machine that lets you switch from 2-wheel drive, to full-time 4-wheel drive.

From high mileage on the road- NARRATOR: But one obstacle the Eagle couldn't overcome, was a brutal recession that sank industry sales to a 20-year-low.

NARRATOR: On top of that, increasing news coverage of Jeep rollover crashes had prompted a wave of costly lawsuits.

As a result, AMC ended 1980 even deeper in the red.

And Renault came to the rescue again, increasing its stake to 46.1 percent.

COMMERCIAL SPOKESMAN: American cars guzzle gas.

American cars are all style and no substance.

American cars don't last.

To all that, American Motors says, "nuts."

This American Motors Concord and this Spirit are built to be more than just good looking.

They're tough.

Tougher than ever before.

NARRATOR: By 1981, car buyers were more concerned than ever about reliability and gas mileage.

But American cars had developed a bad reputation, especially compared to their Japanese competitors.

PORTER: They were simply ahead of us in terms of their ability to deliver a really high quality vehicle.

The paint didn't flake.

You didn't have rust issues.

People didn't experience the same level of rattles and squeaks that you might have found with the American vehicles.

So, you know, word of mouth, demand spread.

NARRATOR: "Quality" became the automotive buzzword of the day.

MEYERS: When we get into production with Renault-type vehicles, and we're not going to wait 'til then, that our quality will be fine European quality.

The kind that a very serious buyer of a European car is going to insist upon.

NARRATOR: Marketing shifted to AMC's industry-leading warranty, and its innovative use of zinc-coated, rust-resistant, galvanized steel.

COMMERCIAL SPOKESMAN: The only American cars with galvanized steel in 100 percent of the exterior body panels, that's right, 100 percent!"

SAM GROOM: They came to me for just one commercial, where I'm walking along the assembly line, talking to a girl.

They didn't stop the assembly line, the assembly line was just running when we shot.

And from what I understand, they tested that, and it tested so highly that they rushed back and negotiated a two year deal with us to do all their commercials for two years.

COMMERCIAL SPOKESMAN: Concord and Spirit.

For good-looking, high-mileage cars, don't sell the Tough Americans short!

SAM GROOM: I went to Lorimar Pictures to meet with them about a project, and I walked by one woman and she said, "I bought a car because of you.

Don't tell my husband!"

[Laughs] [Factory noise, buzzing, banging] NARRATOR: The renewed emphasis on quality extended to the factory, but old habits died hard.

PAUL ROSKRES: They were concerned about quality, they wanted quality, but also they wanted numbers.

Chop, chop.

Let's get going.

It's got to be done fast.

ROMAN WOJEIECHOWICZ: We're supposed to be running forty cars an hour.

We only done 30 the last hour, what's the problem?

Let it go, let it go, let it go, it'll be caught at the end of the line.

Now if you're not addressing the quality at point A, when it gets down to point D, it's harder to fix.

[Angsty rock music starts] NARRATOR: This hypocrisy was just one of many problems highlighted by John Drew, Jon Melrod, and Tod Ohnstad, in their activist newsletter, "The Fighting Times."

DREW: We made thousands of copies, and we would stand at the plant gates and hand it out.

And we would solicit articles, and we had a really good cartoonist, too.

[Laughs] Which, people liked the cartoons a lot because the cartoons kind of lampooned management.

NARRATOR: But the favorite feature by far, was "Scab of the Month."

BILLY AIELLO: They would pick a certain supervisor and just berate them!

DREW: We called out supervisors who had made racist remarks.

We talked about unsafe conditions and sexual harassment.

NARRATOR: While women had worked in the plant for decades, they still could face behavior that ranged from annoying to outright abusive.

BETTY BROWN: You have to be the person to stand up and fight for yourself, because yes, the men will come after you.

Whistling at you, giving you nicknames.

Some of them would be begging to go out with you, no matter how often you say no.

NARRATOR: But nobody was safe from the power of the press.

TOD ONHSTAD: We never had any shortage of material every month.

The most infamous of these supervisors was a guy by the name of Stevie Freeman.

And he had told a probationary woman employee that she had to have sex with him.

He called another Black worker a lazy [deleted] in front of all of his coworkers.

So these were like really adversarial, kind of nutty supervisors.

DANNY LAMANTIA: They didn't nail you, did they?

AIELLO: I asked them to actually!

I said, "Hey, make me Scab of the Month!"

And they said, "We can't make you Scab of the Month; you're the best one here!"

[Factory noise] NARRATOR: Then in September of 1980, six of the aggrieved "scabs," took matters into their own hands.

DREW: They sued us um for $4 million dollars!

Which, I don't know what 4 million dollars is now, but it was a lot, it was it was a daunting figure.

NARRATOR: The little newsletter had gotten the trio into big trouble, that would take years to resolve.

NARRATOR: By now, AMC dealers were also selling imported Renaults, and AMC employees were slowly warming up to their French coworkers.

FRANK PASCOE: One of the managers approached me one day and he said, "We understand that you speak French.

When these guys come in, kind of hang out in the corner there and listen in to what they're saying?"

So I was sort-of, like, hiding behind the plant in the corner, you know, with my ear out like this.

But, we didn't really learn anything.

[photocopier noise] PAM HUEGLI: I was at the copier machine, and that copier wouldn't work for anything, and I was doing some pretty blue language in French.

Someone walked up in back of me, and he said, "My goodness-" And he said it in French, [speaking French] And I thought, "Oh my gosh, he understood everything I said!"

I was so embarrassed.

TASSI: I was part of an exchange program, and I really enjoyed being over there.

They had a real international cast of employees.

At lunchtime, we'd sit around a big table and they they had bottles of wine, but there was the same creativity there.

And I think creative people are similar around the world.

NARRATOR: But in the executive suite, things were less friendly.

EXECUTIVE: On the track... Tasked with modernizing AMC's outdated operations, a hot-tempered Belgian named Jose Dedeurwaerder became the new head of product and manufacturing.

And immediately clashed with Gerry Meyers.

FOSTER: Dedeurwaerder was very aggressive, and like all the Renault people that I can think of, their attitude was, don't tell us how to make cars.

You're the guys that are going down the tubes, we're one of the largest automobile companies in the world, so don't tell us how to build a car.

We already know.

NARRATOR: Development costs for the new car, the new Jeep, and the new equipment to build them, were astronomical.

NARRATOR: In response, AMC laid off 13 percent of its white-collar employees, and bargained with the United Autoworkers Union for a 10 percent pay cut, promising to pay it back later.

The situation was grim.

JOSEPH CAPPY: Gerry Meyers was extremely well trained and educated to be able to run an automotive company.

But you can't run one without capital.

Because without the money, he did not have the product.

The product was coming, but the whole thing boiled down to, would it come fast enough, and there's no way it could.

NARRATOR: In February of 1982, after two decades at American Motors and four years as CEO, Gerry Meyers resigned.

The man who forged the Renault partnership had been forced out by it.

GERALD MEYERS: Well it was hard, but everything has an end.

And uh when Renault not only bought our company, but when they decided to run our company, that was too much for me.

By that time, my ego had gotten overcharged, and I thought, if I can't run this company, I'd better leave it.

And I did.

NARRATOR: In his place, Paul Tippet became CEO and Jose Dedeurwaerder, President.

NARRATOR: During the shake up, Dedeurwaerder hired Joe Cappy to lead a new marketing strategy, which didn't include AMC cars.

CAPPY: I really took Dedeurwaerder's message to heart and realized that in the future it was going to be Renault and Jeep, and we should get ready for that.

FOSTER: As their ownership grew, Renault wanted to sell Renault cars.

They began to feel like, "We don't need these AMC cars.

They're old, they don't sell all that well, you know, the technology is becoming passé, so let's get rid of them."

NARRATOR: The problem was, so far, Renault sales were lousy.

COMMERCIAL: Renault LeCar, why drive an ordinary car?

When you can have exceptional ride, handling, and interior room, for under $5,000?

LeCar, by Renault!

DEAN GREB: Their government controlled their markets.

So they really didn't have a lot of competition.

So they didn't have a very good understanding of how competitive the American market was.

And it was difficult for us to explain that to 'em.

JOHN DAVIS: I think the Europeans didn't make a lot of effort to fine tune those vehicles for the American market.

So you got in them and the radios were weird and the gauges were not quite placed where we would like them, and it all made them a little uncomfortable.

NARRATOR: But, Renault had another chance with the sporty 1982 Fuego.

COMMERCIAL: Renault Fuego invites you to enter...

THE TURBO ZONE!

[Intense string music] CAPPY: And when the dealers saw it, they immediately doubled their orders.

COMMERCIAL: Renault Fuego, priced to move you from the here and now, into...

THE TURBO ZONE!

CAPPY: The problem is, they hadn't sold enough of 'em to discover that they had a serious electrical problem.

You'd be driving down the street, and all of the sudden, it would stop, dead.

FRANK PASCOE: They had issues with the fuel injectors, it was leaking and it would spit out on a hot motor and boom!

And that happened frequently.

You could drive around the expressways of Detroit and see a burned out Fuego.

JOSEPH: And it was a terrible thing because until that happened, sales were just shooting off like a rocket.

NARRATOR: Furious, Deduerwarder blamed the dealers for not selling more Fuegos, but the damage was done.

However, Renault and AMC's luck was about to change.

[Drumroll] COMMERCIAL: These are the great cars of Europe.

For most people, their price has put them out of reach.

Now, Renault closes the gap between European technology, and affordability.

[Giant boom] COMMERCIAL: Introducing Renault Alliance.

A fine European sedan with electronic fuel injection, front wheel drive, four wheel independent suspension... NARRATOR: After five agonizing years, two CEOs, a second oil crisis, record inflation and interest rates, layoffs, lawsuits, and hundreds of millions of dollars, the new economy car arrived, as the 1983 Renault Alliance.

Based on the French Renault 9 and built in Kenosha it was the car everyone had been waiting for.

COMMERCIAL: The "Alliance" of quality and affordability is here.

[Gong chimes] NARRATOR: Branding remained a touchy subject, but to placate loyalists, a small AMC logo was added to the trunk.

But with the upcoming cancellation of the Concord and Spirit, the Eagle was now the last "true" AMC.

The future was in Renault's hands.

ANNOUNCER: The Complete Book of AMC Cars features a fully-illustrated history of American Motors vehicles, and is available online at MPT.org/Shop.

Or call the phone number on the screen.

To learn more about the cars and the people of American Motors, connect with The Last Independent Automaker online.

ANNOUNCER: Funding for The Last Independent Automaker was provided in part by... [Driving rhythmic music] WOMAN: We are Detroit.

And when we move, you move.

ANNOUNCER: Funding was also provided by...

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation... MotorCities National Heritage Area... And also... For a complete list of funders, visit APTonline.org